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CHITDREN  AND  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF 
VIOLENCE:  CONTRASTING  CULTURES  OF 
PUNISHMENT  IN  NORTHERN  NIGERIA 
Murray Last 
When, in  1992,  the Norwegian Centre for Child Research held an 
interdisciplinary  conference on 'children at risk', a central issue was 
how to identify  which children  within a community might be 'at risk'.  In 
discussions, however, it emerged that an equally central problem was 
identifying which communities or cultures put their children 'at risk', 
and why (Stephens,  1995: 3-48).  Hence  the question: what, cross- 
culturally,  constituted a 'risk'?  Given both the movement for recognis- 
ing  governmentally the  Rights of  the  Child  and  the  campaign to 
eliminate from Europe all physical punishment of children whether at 
home or at school, 'physical punishment' (along with 'child labour') 
was a conveniently current theme to use as shorthand for a range of 
issues when discussing the risks and dangers to which children are 
exposed  in  various societies.  Among  these  issues  was  the  further 
question of  how  societies outside Europe and north America view 
physical  punishment and the broader  risks,  personal and social, entailed 
in its use  (or non-use).  The  problem was not whether 'all children 
should  (or  should  never)  be  beaten',  but  why  it  was  that  some 
communities tolerate its (occasional) use as an ultimate sanction while 
others find all physical punishment of children wholly unacceptable. 
There is,  of course, a third category of people who consider severe 
physical  punishment essential to the upbringing  of children (or did so in 
the past; cf. Greven, 1991); here it seems there was a consensus that in 
this case punishment was liable to be excessive and that children  might 
indeed be classified as 'at risk'. 
This article  was originally  conceived as part of these debates, since it 
offers an example, from outside industrialised  Euro-America,  of how a 
single large society is split over whether or not to tolerate the physical 
punishment of  children. It examines why there are two  contrasting 
traditions of child rearing there and how, at a particular  period in its 
recent history, one  segment  of  this  society tolerated the  increased 
exposure of boys to  physical violence at the hands of  adults. This 
example has a wider resonance in the way it suggests that the beating of 
boys-or  discipline through threats of  physical pain-became  asso- 
ciated with 'modernity', in particular  with schooling, and, conversely, 
that the refusal to beat a child was associated with backward, 'bush' 
behaviour and with potentially undisciplined, 'wild' children; civilised, 
urbane (and in this case Muslim) children were brought up differently. 
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My  hypothesis  is  that  the  difference  in  attitude  to  the  beating  of 
children  is  symptomatic  of  a much  wider  divergence-in  attitudes  to 
childhood,  to  violence,  to  the  way  the  world  is  experienced  and 
understood.  The  reluctance  to  adopt  (or adapt to)  new  styles  of child 
punishment  can  thus  be  seen  in  this  case  as  part  of  people's  wider 
doubts  about  the modern,  urban-centred  world  and  some  of its ways. 
The  fact that I will be discussing  here a long-established  Muslim  culture 
means  I will offer a perspective  on discipline  and punishment  different 
from  that  given  by  Michel  Foucault  (1975)  for  a Europe  that  in  the 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  was  becoming  organised  for 
capitalist industrialisation. 
Ethnographic  discussion  of physical  punishment  (or its  absence)  in 
Africa is surprisingly sparse. Even modern  monographs  that specifically 
focus on 'growing up', for example by anthropologists  such as Christine 
Oppong  (1973:  51),  Marida  Hollos  and  Philip  Leis  (1989:  87;  the 
companion  volume  on  Morocco,  by Susan  and Douglas  Davis,  1989: 
79,  is no  fuller),  Simon  Ottenberg  (1989:  119),  Ann  Schlyter  (1999: 
89)  or by  educationalists  such  as Ngwobia  Uka  (1966:  65)  or James 
Hake  (1972:  40,  91;  he  does  include  beating  in  his  questionnaire, 
however)  mention  it in one paragraph at most  if at all. Nor  is there any 
mention  of it in a monograph  like Suzette  Heald's  (1989)  that focuses 
on  an East  African  community  (the  Gisu)  with  a high  level  of  social 
violence,  including  even parricide and filicide;  near by, in East Africa, 
Sarah and  Robert  LeVine  (1981:  41)  tell  of  Gusii  men  beating  wives 
and sons  only when  drunk (but cf. LeVine  and LeVine,  1966:  193).  A 
recent  exception  is Paul  Riesman's  study,  published  posthumously  in 
1992,  of Fulbe  childhood  in northern  Burkina Faso; though  he reports 
witnessing  no  incident  of beating,  he  does  discuss  at some  length  the 
practice  and  its  implications  for  children  (pp.  134-8).  Similarly, 
Caroline  Bledsoe's  essay  (1990:  70-88)  on  the value  of hardship  only 
implies  that  at  the  back  of  Mende  foster-children's  minds  in  Sierra 
Leone  there is a real threat of beatings  by adults  as well  as insults  and 
other  forms  of maltreatment.  Barrington  Kaye's  study  of bringing  up 
children  in Ghana,  for which  significantly  he  is using  a series  of local 
studies  by various  students  of the  Institute  of  Education  at Legon,  is 
richer  in  detail  than  most,  with  (possibly  first-hand)  accounts  of 
punishments  other  than  beating  (1962:  140-6).  Of  the  specialist 
monographs  of  an  earlier generation,  such  as those  by  Meyer  Fortes 
([1938]  1970:  228,  234),  Otto  Raum  (1940:  225-31),  Hamed  Ammar 
(1954:  137-9,  209-11)  and Margaret Read  (1959:  43-4),  only Ammar 
and  Raum  treated  physical  punishment  as  a  significant  topic,  while 
other  classic  ethnographies  such  as  those  by  Monica  Hunter  (1936: 
164,  or her Wilson  1951  study  of  the  Nyakyusa,  cf.  88,  138-9,  142, 
152),  S. F. Nadel  (1942:  ch. XXII)  or Kenneth  Little ([1951]  1967: ch. 
VI)  are no  more  detailed  than their modern  equivalents.  It was left to 
surveys  first by  Pierre  Erny  in  1972  and  then  by  Sarah  and  Robert 
LeVine in 1981 briefly to draw conclusions  from such references as they 
could  find. 
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There are three possible reasons for this: first, that such punishments 
simply did not ever occur in the communities studied; or, second, that, 
if they did occur, such domestic violence (whether against children or 
indeed wives) was of no  theoretical or empirical significance at the 
time-it  was simply taken for granted by Western observers unless it 
was ritualised. Or, thirdly, that the researcher  was simply never made 
aware of such punishments either because they occurred too rarely or 
because they were carried out precisely when he or she, as a visitor, 
would be absent. Whichever is the reason, such domestic violence is 
given little emphasis amid all the other details of daily life that have 
been put on record by ethnographers. 
It has nonetheless been  argued that, as a gross generalisation, in 
'traditional'  Africa adults did not commonly beat their own children, 
either in punishment or in anger (cf. Ery,  1972: 128-35; LeVine and 
LeVine, 1981: 37-8,  51).1 Beatings did of course happen, but often it 
was other family members who did the beating; or else it was done 
ritually,  as part of harsh rites of initiation into adulthood (La Fontaine, 
1986: 98, 114; cf. Zahan, [1970] 1979: 112; Turnbull 1961: 203): the 
experience of pain or hurt was certainly  not absent from childhood and 
adolescence. Tears (and attempts to  suppress them) were not rare; 
bullying occurred. That  the threat of physical violence from others 
(including step-parents)  is ancient and seemed real enough is suggested 
too by the folk stereotypes  and jokes that alluded to the characters  most 
likely to abuse a child, and warned children to be on their guard (for 
Hausaland cf. Furiss,  1996: 56-69);  I have heard women tell such 
terrifying  tales, and listened to children  worrying  over them, at least for 
a while. Similarly  with witches: there was much to scare a child with, 
the threatened violence being expressed in very physical terms. 
Purely verbal violence-scolding  and swearing at an erring child-is 
by contrast reportedly commonplace. Its aim is to  cause maximum 
shame and to humiliate  through scorn and through  making  others laugh 
at the victim's expense. The story could be retold, the phrases  teasingly 
called out, by young and old alike. But the worst form of such verbal 
violence was a parent's  curse, and it was not inflicted lightly. It was oral, 
not corporal,  punishment, then, that promised lasting pain; no strength 
was needed to inflict it, and it was much harder to run away from. 
Oral 'punishment' is considered within a wider study by Beatrice 
Whiting, Carolyn Edwards and their colleagues (1988)  in which they 
1 There  is  a  tendency,  especially  in  the  literature opposed  to  corporal punishment,  to 
contrast stereotypically the great gentleness towards children among such 'primitive' cultures 
as the Australian Aborigines and the Kalahari Bushmen with the harshness of more 'civilised' 
societies.  For example, in an early anthropological comparison of punishment worldwide by 
Sebald Rudolf Steinmetz in  1892 and 1898  (quoted by Durkheim,  [1925]  1961:  184),  only 
thirteen of the  104  societies  surveyed inflicted corporal punishment  on their children; and 
those  thirteen  had  'relatively  advanced'  cultures.  In  this  context,  twentieth-century 
observations have to be treated with caution in places where ideology and colonial practice 
have been influential. What actually happened in the domestic life of children in any part of, 
say, fourteenth-century sub-Saharan Africa is simply unknown. 
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compare  the socialisation  of children  in rural Africa, India,  South  East 
Asia  and  the  Americas.  They  are more  concerned  with  'reprimands' 
and  'negative  control'  than with  an act  as specific  as beating;  indeed, 
they make no mention  of physical punishment  occurring in the Kenyan 
cultures they studied.  They  postulate  that 'pro-social  training' is typical 
of African cultures,  in contrast to the 'controlling'  they found  common 
in north  India: that  children  in Africa are more  often  encouraged,  by 
mothers  and  sisters  alike,  to  behave  in  conformity  with  the  social 
expectations  of  those  around  them  whereas  children  in  India  are 
restrained, if necessary through threats of violence  (especially  for boys), 
from  acting  against  adults'  needs  or  demands.  In  his  survey  of  the 
literature  on  Africa  Pierre  Erny  had  earlier come  to  a rather  similar 
conclusion:  an  adult  rarely  beats  his  or  her  child.  Instead,  Erny 
suggests,  it is elder children who control and socialise younger children, 
and punish them  as they think fit-and  such punishment  can be violent 
(and merge  into bullying).  The  exceptions  are, firstly, Muslim  society, 
in which  physical  punishment  of children  by adults  antedates  colonial 
rule;  and,  secondly,  Christian  schooling  (whether  mission-  or  state- 
run),  which  became  the site  for  making  the  physical  punishment  of 
children culturally acceptable  both in the colonial period and thereafter. 
Both  Muslim  and Christian schooling  was  (and still is) associated  with 
social  advancement  as well  as with  a  superior  religious  ethic;  school 
practice gave beating  a moral legitimacy  it did not have before.  Further 
legitimacy  accrued  to  beating  by  virtue  of  it  being  a  particularly 
European  practice.  In  what  is  now  Namibia  the  missionary  Alfred 
Unterkotter  as early as  1937  recorded  the  Bushman  convert,  Xkoou- 
goa  Xob,  pointing  out  that  it was  from  whites  (who  even  beat  adult 
Bushmen)  that they  learnt to beat  their children  (Westermann,  1938: 
18).  The  same,  however,  could  not  be  said  of  Muslim  cultures  of 
punishment,  which  of  course  stem  historically  from  the  same  eastern 
Mediterranean  traditions  as do the  cultures  of Europe.  Then,  as now, 
the  state's  use  of flogging  as punishment  in a number  of institutions, 
Muslim  or Christian,  is surely as much  a model  for schoolmasters  (in 
loco parentis though  they  are) as parental beating  in the home. 
It is really only in the  autobiographies  and  (semi-)fictional  accounts 
of African childhoods  that something  is conveyed  of the violence  or the 
threat of violence  as it is (or was)  experienced  by children.2 Given  that 
such  accounts  are mostly  the  product  of  an  educated  elite,  it  is  not 
surprising that their schooling  has a central place in their experience  of 
being  beaten.  In  these  recollections  Muslim  teachers  are depicted  as 
2  Most  autobiographical accounts of childhood  are by men,  especially where schooling is 
described. The major exception is the account dictated to Mary Smith in 1949-50  by Baba, a 
Muslim  Hausa woman who was a young child in the Kano-Zaria borderland in the  1890s 
before the British conquest (Smith, 1954 [1991]).  She describes the fighting and beatings that 
young girls experienced, as well as the Qur'anic school that one husband of hers ran during the 
colonial period and the pre-trial prison beatings administered to suspects by another husband 
(pp. 47-8,  78,  131-4,  181-3). 
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notoriously hard on their pupils, albeit in the name of religion:  children 
simply had  to  learn to  obey  (and fear) God;  they  simply had  to 
internalise His word by memorising the  Qur'an (e.g.  Kane,  [1961] 
1972: 3-7; Sanneh, 1975: 168-86).  But what children experienced  was 
sometimes  less  than  religious: abuse,  physical and  sexual,  is  very 
occasionally hinted at (e.g. Tafawa Balewa, 1934: 54, 58; Beita Yusuf, 
1978).  Memories  of  growing  up  in  Christian schools  are  more 
mundane: here it is pranks that are punished by beatings, not failures 
of piety, and it is this-worldly morality and obedience that are backed 
up  by  threats of  physical punishment  (e.g.  Nzioki,  1967:  112-18; 
Soyinka, 1981: 165-7); bullying by older boys was also a problem (e.g. 
Laye, 1954: 63-78).  Not  surprisingly,  few autobiographers  admit to 
being sexually abused as children or to seriously shaming experiences, 
let alone to bullying others; the few incidents of abuse I know were all 
recounted to me privately  and hesitantly, yet at the same time were not 
thought to be particularly  unusual. 
There  remains,  however,  the  question  whether  the  absence  of 
ethnographic references to  physical  punishment  also  reflects  the 
difficulty for an outsider of  even setting eyes on  'children at risk'. 
The chronic invisibility of child abuse in Europe and America is now 
well recognised, despite the dispute over particular  cases (La Fontaine, 
1990). Could there be a similar  invisibility  elsewhere?  Paradoxically,  an 
underlying  assumption  has to be that it is often in apparently  peaceable, 
well  ordered communities that children can be  particularly at  risk 
because they are unseen and unheard. The very 'ordering'  hides all but 
the most blatant disorder.  To see an incident requires  living behind the 
facade of order, to hear of it requires people to  speak-more  often 
about others than about themselves because there is so much shame 
involved. The field material on children and violence may have to be 
obtained using less conventional academic methods, and hypotheses 
may have to  rely on  evidence that is in parts more anecdotal than 
systematic. 
With  generalisations about  a  'traditional Africa' so  often  being 
artefacts of our own not-knowing, we surely need now to  ask more 
systematically  whether beating has indeed extended back home from 
school, whether a new culture of punishment is developing even in 
deeply rural areas of Africa. We need to  know, too,  whether some 
communities have  always, unknown to  us,  advocated the  physical 
punishment of children by adults at home  as a means of enforcing 
discipline, and why. Only then can there be both seriously informed 
discussions about 'children at risk' from this form of hurt in Africa and 
practical suggestions of what to do about them. This article lays out, 
then, not just a set of data about a particular  part of Africa  but suggests 
one, admittedly imperfect, way of acquiring  and analysing  information 
on  a  subject  potentially  very  sensitive  for  both  individuals  and 
communities. 
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ON METHODS 
A note first, then,  on the methods  and materials used here. The  data on 
which  this  article  is  based  were  collected  in  Nigeria  over  the  period 
1961-99,  starting from when I went  as a full-time  student  to University 
College,  Ibadan. The  core evidence,  however,  comes from my two years 
living  in  a Maguzawa  farmstead  in  southern  Katsina  (1970-72,  with 
almost  annual  visits  subsequently)  and  from  a five-year  collaborative 
project on youth health in urban Kano  (1988-93;  a second  project is in 
progress,  1998-  ).  During  the nearly forty years of living in or visiting 
northern  Nigeria  I have  always been  a guest  in the  houses  or flats  of 
Nigerian  friends  (apart from two years when  I had  a household  of my 
own)  and  have  always  been  part  of  an  academic  department,  either 
teaching  or being taught. In this context  I do not 'interview' my hosts or 
their children,  I do  not  run a tape-recorder  during  supper  or in class. 
Conversations  are 'off the record',  though  I admit to a habit of making 
notes  afterwards on points  of particular interest.  The  formal research I 
have  done  on  pre-colonial  history,  on  Islamic  scholarship,  on  health, 
agriculture  and  related  matters  has  been  systematic,  but  much  of the 
material in this article has not arisen from a similarly focused  research 
project on, say, 'children and violence'.  The  areas where I have worked 
range from  Sokoto  to  Adamawa,  from  Katsina  to  Nupe,  from  strictly 
Muslim  quarters in the old cities of Sokoto,  Kano and Zaria to a deeply 
rural  'pagan'  farmstead,  a  pastoral  Fulani  camp  and  a  sectarian 
commune.  The  range  has  been  deliberately  wide,  in  an  attempt  to 
understand  in  some  depth  the  diversity within  a complex  society  like 
that of northern  Nigeria. 
I  would  defend  the  value  of  the  material  offered  here  against  any 
claim  that  short-term,  interview-oriented  research  by visiting  scholars 
was the only form of valid data-gathering.  Indeed,  my experience  as the 
editor of this journal suggests  that what is sometimes  to be published  as 
a  (translated)  quotation  from  an  interview  is  not  always  the  sure 
evidence  it purports to be. This  article, then, is offered as a synthesis,  at 
a time  when  not  only  is long-term,  first-hand  field  research becoming 
more rare but when fewer young foreigners,  as I was, enjoy the privilege 
of being a full-time  student  or teacher in a Nigerian  university as well as 
being  a frequent  guest  in the  homes  of Nigerians.  The  understanding 
gained this way, however,  has nonetheless  an academic  value, I suggest, 
to put alongside  the evidence  more  conventionally  collected  by others. 
THE  ETHNOGRAPHIC  CONTEXT 
The  Hausa-speaking  cultures  of  northern  Nigeria  occupy  the  huge 
savanna  plains  that  in  the  early nineteenth  century  were  unified  as  a 
single political unit known in the literature (since c. 1965)  as the Sokoto 
Caliphate;  at its height  in the  pre-colonial  period,  the  state's  size was 
measured  as a four months'  journey from east to west,  and two months' 
north  to  south-it  was  the  largest polity  in Africa  (Last,  1967).  Now 
overwhelmingly  Muslim  and numbering  some  40  million,  the  peoples 
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on these plains have developed over some five centuries a lingua franca, 
Hausa, and a common culture which has, nonetheless, distinct local 
cultural 'dialects' many of which are identified with one or other of the 
major emirates that constituted the Caliphate. 
There is a settlement pattern common to many of these emirates. A 
great walled  city  stands  at  the  emirate's core,  surrounded by  an 
extensive hinterland  of continuous farmed  parkland  in which have been 
built towns and villages, with their rural markets and craft work, the 
whole linked with the city by a network of roads and tracks.  Beyond this 
hinterland  is an area  that is a frontier  zone between emirates, occupying 
the higher land between river  basins and therefore constituting 'bush', 
with forest land and hills. Communities in this 'deep rural' area were 
marginal  in both the pre-colonial and the colonial periods: hunters and 
pastoralists, miners and charcoal burners, sectarian communes  and 
'pagan' Maguzawa farmsteads lived or camped in  this zone,  while 
traders hurriedly passed through it,  fearing both  brigands and evil 
spirits  (that  might  inflict  illness  on  them).  The  Maguzawa  are 
considered by Muslim Hausa as representing  the original, pre-Islamic 
element  of  their  own  culture,  and  therefore  have  a  particular 
significance for how contemporary Hausa conceptualise their society. 
They represent what Hausa society once was, and therefore serve as a 
yardstick by which Muslims measure the progress of Muslim Hausa- 
land (Krusius, 1915; Reuke, 1969; Barkow, 1973; Last, 1985, 1993c). 
There remains an element of this old frontier  culture even today that 
is quite different  from more bourgeois village life in the hinterland.  The 
three elements of Hausa society-the  city, the hinterland and the deep 
countryside-offer  distinct social, religious and economic niches for 
individuals (or families) to move between, either seasonally or, when 
young, as migrants in search of a new career. In recent years the better 
roads and buses, the radios and the new schools, the market  traders  and 
the fundamentalist preachers have all extended the 'hinterland' into 
areas that were once deemed 'bush'. People adapt their habits to the 
new  style  of  living, while  others move  away, to  be  further from 
government, or to open up new farmland.  The situation I am analysing, 
then, is fluid, hence the importance, I think, of understanding trends 
over time as well as regional variation. 
Nigeria's  general statistical data  relevant to  the  ethnography of 
children in Hausaland are not reliable; censuses are politically far too 
important to  be  left  to  statisticians. My  own  detailed  studies  of 
mortality over twenty years in the southern Katsina farmstead showed 
that half the children born in that farmstead (66 out of 131) had died 
within the first five years of life. But what was particularly  striking  was 
the way one wife might have almost 90 per cent of her children alive 
while a co-wife in exactly the same environment  had 90 per cent of hers 
dead (Last, 1992). The extreme variation  underlies some of the cultural 
meanings attached  to children and the way to rear  them, just as the high 
mortality rate remains for people a matter of anxiety even when the 
number of deaths actually  declines. HIV and AIDS, at least in the areas 
where I have been working recently, have yet to make an impact in the 
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way  the  epidemic  has  decimated  eastern  and  southern  Africa.  Other 
epidemics,  such  as  measles,  cerebro-spinal  meningitis  and  cholera, 
recur at regular intervals, with measles  being lethal to young  children as 
it is not  in Europe.  Sickle-cell  anaemia  is another  cause  of early death, 
with no sicklers living beyond  about puberty in this area, unlike coastal 
Nigeria  or Ghana  (Molineaux  and Gramiccia,  1980),  but guinea worm, 
which  used  to  be  a scourge  of children  (and  even  babies)  in the  early 
1970s,  has now  effectively  been  eradicated.  Children,  then,  remain  'at 
risk' and require adults'  moral and ritual protection  against illness: the 
high rates of morbidity  and mortality do not result in a passive fatalism. 
The  rituals of growing  up in Hausaland  are not  elaborate.  Contrary 
to the practice  of Muslims  in north-eastern  Africa, young  Hausa  girls, 
whether  Muslim  or not,  are subjected  to  neither  clitoral  excision  nor 
infibulation.  Instead,  within the first month  of life, a baby will have the 
uvula (beli, belu) nicked with a special hooked  tool and in addition,  on a 
girl, nicks are made on one or both of her hypertrophied  hymeneal  tags. 
The  latter are spoken of as if they were the clitoris (belu; belun  gindi) and 
are thus  symbolically  the genital  equivalent  of the  uvula  in the throat, 
but whenever  I have observed it the operation  does not in fact touch  the 
clitoris,  which  at  that  age  has  not  developed  (Last,  1976;  cf.  Smith, 
1954:  141-2  [1991:  38]).  If not  cut, both  beli and belu are expected  to 
grow  and  block  entry  to  the  throat  and  vagina.  The  operation  is 
therefore  not  phrased  as  a  measure  facilitating  later  control  over 
women's  sexuality  (not  least  since  conception  is  thought  to  require 
orgasm)  but  is explicitly  designed  to  facilitate  the  linked  processes  of 
eating/drinking  and reproduction.  (I have known  cases of tonsillitis  and 
a chronic  sore throat in adult women  be  attributed  to failure to  excise 
the  beli adequately  when  young.  These  cases  only  confirmed  to people 
the  purely  practical  necessity  of  excision.)  Symbolically,  though, 
'circumcision'  of girls is considered  to have  indeed  taken place,  but  it 
has  only  social,  not  physical,  consequences.  Otherwise  during  child- 
hood  the only occasions  marked by a certain festivity for girls are those, 
such as courtship  or the decoration  by a barber of their neck and upper 
chest,  that gradually lead to the major ritual of marriage once  they have 
reached  menarche. 
For  Muslim  boys,  however,  the  experience  of  circumcision  is 
markedly different, both physically  and socially.  It is seen  as religiously 
required (as it is not for girls), and is carried out when they are around 7 
years  old;  it marks the  transition  from  childhood,  when  they  may  be 
sent away from home  to be educated  by a professional  Qur'anic teacher. 
Non-Muslim  boys  are circumcised  much  later, at around  13 years; for 
them  it is simply  a matter of tradition  (gado), and its pain  a necessary 
part  of  the  process  of  becoming  eligible  to  court  girls.  For  both,  the 
operation is a public test of their self-control  in the face of pain; it makes 
them  almost-men,  in the way marriage transforms a girl into an almost- 
woman.  For both,  it is the addition  of a dependant-for  a woman,  her 
first child; for a man, his first wife-that  marks entry into full adulthood 
(Last,  1979). 
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Finally, a brief comment on the Hausa terms for beating (duka) and 
striking (buga) someone, since they cover a much wider spectrum of 
acts than is indicated by the English words normally used to translate 
them. For example, in my experience a blow can refer in Hausa to little 
more than a prod or poke with the fingers on another's face or body: 
such  unsolicited  touching  is  itself  seen  as  highly  aggressive and 
humiliating. People of either sex do not in the normal course of life 
openly hold another's hands, for example, or squeeze an arm or rest a 
hand upon a shoulder-so  that I have, when absentmindedly  tapping a 
neighbour on the arm to get his attention, caused him to start suddenly 
instead. In this context, where an 'ordinary'  gentle touch is invasive, an 
angry  poke feels like a punch. It is therefore  not necessary  always  to feel 
acute physical  pain to be seriously  hurt by a 'blow'. But this is true only 
of one end of the spectrum  of violence. At the other end of the spectrum 
is a beating with a stick or a whip. It is reserved  for those who are clearly 
subordinate,  like  slaves  and  animals; youths  who  have  seriously 
misbehaved fall into this category. It is formalised, too: the number 
of lashes on the back varies according to the crime, the exact number 
and method being prescribed  in Islamic, colonial and now national law 
codes, though actual practice, official and unofficial, I understand, is 
more idiosyncratic. The pain is known to be too severe to bear-so 
severe that, in Kano city in  1959,  for example, Muslims have been 
known to declare themselves in court to be non-Muslims after all-and 
the judge has accepted it rather  than inflict the flogging then required 
by law. 
The 'beating' of children which I will be discussing in what follows 
lies between these two extremes on the spectrum of violence.3 Yet it too 
varies widely in severity.  Again, it is not so much the pain that is feared 
as the humiliation, and it is often the  adult that is feared, not  the 
punishment itself (as Riesman, 1992:138, also suggested). So too with 
the  rejection of  beating  as  a  means  of  discipline: it  is  the  social 
implications that are considered wrong, not the suffering  itself. 
ONE SOCIETY, TWO SYSTEMS  OF DISCIPLINE 
The questions I raised at the start  were, firstly,  how do two segments of 
3 
My  use  of the word 'beating' in this article covers in English a wider range of terms. 
Flogging refers usually to the use of a special instrument, the 'cat o' nine tails' (a 'lash' being 
one strike with this instrument); it was commonly  used for official punishments.  Whipping 
refers mainly to the use of the horsewhip commonly  found in many households  before the 
advent of the car; it therefore seems to be used often in domestic punishment, but was applied 
more widely in official, public punishment. Beating implies the use of a (semi-flexible) stick, 
rod or cane-which  was typical of a schoolmaster's punishment. Terms like 'smack' or 'slap' 
relate to the instant reprimand of very young children. In countries where English is a second 
language, English terms like 'beat' and 'flog' may be applied to the full range of acts covered 
by such English words as 'smack', 'slap', 'strike', 'hit'. Both in books and in conversation, it is 
easy not to know exactly what form or degree of punishment is being described. A biblical 
usage like 'chastise' or 'chasten' remains ambiguous in current English. 
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a single society, while sharing broadly similar cultural values and norms, 
nonetheless  articulate  their  sharply  differing  attitudes  towards  the 
physical  punishment  of  children;  and,  secondly,  under  what  circum- 
stances  might  a  culture  over  time  adopt  a more,  rather than  a  less, 
violent  stance  towards  disciplining  its young.  I present  my material in 
the form of two contrasting  childhoods,  to emphasise  both the range of 
experience  and the  kinds of choices  parents  and children  make within 
one,  rather fluid,  society.  I start with  childhood  in a non-Muslim  (i.e. 
'pagan')  farmstead, .deep in the northern  countryside,  where I lived for 
two  years in the  early 1970s.  I follow  it with  a brief sketch  of Muslim 
childhood,  with its discipline  and its schooling-and  its alternatives-- 
which  my  Nigerian  colleagues  and  I have  been  chronicling  over  five 
years in  the  Youth  Health  Project  funded  by  the  British Academy  at 
Bayero University,  Kano  (Last,  1991 a). 
The children of non-Muslims: the rejection  of physical punishment 
'We  don't  beat  our  children-the  Muslims  do,  though.'  I was  taken 
aback  when  I  heard  this,  since  I  knew  well  the  reputation  of  West 
Africans and West  Indians for disciplining  their children,  and had seen 
over  many  years  the  way  Muslim  Hausa  like  to  maintain  control  at 
home  and  in  school.  We  were  discussing  a  troublesome  boy  with  a 
reputation  for thieving.  No  one  would  punish  him,  I was  firmly told 
(almost  as a rebuke),  and certainly not with a beating.  The  only people 
who are ever beaten are those whom you want to go away-like  perhaps 
an adulterer,  a witch  or an aggressive  lunatic,  and then  the  beating  is 
better done  collectively.  Indeed,  in the market place the 'market' might 
beat a thief to death, but then it is best to clear off as soon  as a shout of 
'Thief!'  goes  up; better never to get involved.  Such  rare violence  is the 
community's  way  of  policing  itself,  in  an  area  where  courts  are 
somewhat  alien institutions  and there is no rural police  force. 
Why,  when  everyone  else seems  to beat their children,  should  these, 
the  most  traditional  element  of  Hausa-speaking  society,  the  non- 
Muslim  farmers  called  Maguzawa,  not  only  not  use  corporal  punish- 
ment  on  their  children  (though  they  know  well  that  others  more 
'progressive' and of higher status than themselves  do) but actually reject 
the idea of beating? Indeed,  these farmers so dislike the way Muslim-run 
schools  are known to beat children that they initially refused to send any 
of their children  there-and  this in the face  of contempt  and criticism 
from Muslims  that  'pagan'  children  were worthless  because  they were 
undisciplined.  Furthermore  'pagans' do not threaten their wives with a 
beating,  as Muslims  may-and  are despised  for that too.  Certainly,  no 
wife  or child  was beaten  in the  two  years I was  there,  and I heard no 
tales of a beating.  So why this rejection  of physical  violence? 
The  answer,  I  suggest,  can  be  found  on  two  levels.  First,  at  the 
practical level, the men of these farmsteads need their children.  Having 
both  extensive  farmland and livestock,  they are always short of labour: 
they need not only to keep their sons and their wives to work with them 
on the fields,  but  also to attract others-childless  women  who  want to 
start a new  life,  and young  men  who  want  to  escape  the  status-bound 
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conventions of village or town life. Strangers  are thus made welcome as 
potential recruits-or  as potential allies. There is no way a father can 
keep a son or a wife in his household against their will; there are no 
agencies to insist on and enforce their return  home if they totally refuse 
to, and few sanctions of real value that parents or kin can threaten  them 
with. Finally, there are always other places to go to where there will be 
opportunities and a welcome-places  which potentially offer a way to 
move up in society. It would be absurd, then, to alienate one's own 
children. Indeed, the only children whom a father or mother might be 
expected to beat or neglect are those thought to be changelings ('yan 
wabi), where the aim is to ensure that the spirit possessing the child 
never wants to take on human form again (Last, 1992). In practice the 
one  child I  knew well who  certainly did have the  symptoms of  a 
changeling was never beaten or neglected. 
Young children instead are treated as a kind of 'visitor':  they have to 
be won over into staying in the hope that they will not die (as up to half 
the children do); a death can be reframed  as a guest departing.  In ritual 
terms, for example, a child is considered a full member of the house as 
soon  as it is weaned, and has to  have its share of  any sacrifice or 
offering.  From an early  age children  are given parcels  of land to farm  for 
themselves, and provided with miniature hoes and scaled-down water 
pots; they  are often  given livestock of  their own  to  care for,  and 
encouraged to make money for themselves; and, of course, both boys 
and girls have to carry  around and care for their younger siblings. But 
the farm work is hard and repetitive, the herding uncomfortable and 
tedious. In this way children learn to farm, they learn crafts, they learn 
the  skills and  the  various technical  and  social  expertises that  are 
required or that particularly  interest them; they collect firewood, they 
herd  their  mothers'  small  livestock;  they  play  and  watch  and 
gossip-and  listen to the radio. 
Children  are thus drawn  gradually  through  work into the adult world. 
Adults remark  how grown-up a child is by whether or not he or she has 
got the 'common sense' or intelligence (wayo) that in effect makes the 
child useful as a helper and companion around the house; smaller 
children, livestock, errands can then all be entrusted safely to him or 
her. Becoming adult is not marked  by a single formal  ritual  of initiation. 
For a girl, marriage  is only the first part of an initiation whose second 
part is her first childbirth:  thereafter  she is fully adult. For a boy, the 
transition  is similarly  protracted,  starting  with the practice of circumci- 
sion  at  about  puberty-an  occasion  not  especially  marked  by 
ceremony-and  ending  with  his  marriage perhaps four  years  on. 
Indeed, growing up is a process, not a stage marked off simply by a 
ritual occasion or a biological change (Last, 1979). For example, it is 
not even the menarche  per  se but rather  the physical size and strength  of 
a  girl that  determines, for  her  parents, whether she  is  ready for 
marriage.  In short, there is not here even the ritual  violence that so often 
accompanies  initiation  into  adulthood.  (It  is  not  uncommon  for 
communities which do not physically  punish their children in everyday 
life to be ready nonetheless in initiation rituals  to inflict pain and terror 
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violent  enough  that  some  of  the  initiates  actually  die;  La  Fontaine, 
1986:  98,  114). 
It  is  a relatively  stable  adult  world  that  children  enter.  By  Muslim 
Hausa standards there is an extremely low rate of divorce.  Over half the 
women,  for example,  in the farmstead where I lived had been  there for 
over  twenty  years,  and  together  the  women  formed  a cohesive  social 
group,  in all some  forty strong.  Consequently  almost  none  of the sixty 
children in the farmstead was without  both  parents; they were growing 
up  amid  a large array of children  and  adults they  had  known  all their 
lives. Even were some  child to be picked on or neglected,  or should  one 
prove particularly difficult  or handicapped,  there were plenty  of adults 
to  help  or to  stop  any  excessive  act  of  discipline.  Indeed,  it was  the 
father (rather than the mother,  as she told me later) who was closest  to 
the  one  abnormal  child  in the  farmstead-a  boy  who  never  spoke; his 
bossed  head  was  symptomatic  of  the  sickling  trait.  Stepchildren  who 
came  to  the  farmstead  with  their  mothers  on  marriage might  not  get 
land of their own  (instead  they had their mother's  share of fields),  yet 
one  such  stepson  has  grown  up  to  become  the  richest  man  in  the 
farmstead.  Only  one  baby,  an  orphan  from  a  neighbouring  house 
(whom  for a year I tried to  feed),  died,  I think,  of insufficient  care; a 
motherless  baby,  I  was  told  at  the  time,  will  die  anyway-my 
intervention  was  inappropriate  and  the  meddling  (karambani) typical 
of  a stranger.  Children  deaf  from  infancy  continued  to  be  cared  for. 
(There were over six deaf adults in the neighbourhood.)  Certainly none 
of  the  sixty  or more  children  I  got  to  know  well  was  uncared  for  or 
showed  signs of trouble-nor,  in their endless  gossiping  and bringing of 
news,  did any express  concern  to me  over one  of their number. 
Secondly,  on  a more  abstract'level,  the rejection  of violence  reflects 
people's  recognition  that they are fundamentally  powerless  both  in the 
face  of a harsh environment  and within  the wider  society.  It is others 
who  have  the  monopoly  of  force.  Since  these  farmsteads  are  at  the 
bottom  of the social and political  scale, they have no clout as a political 
constituency  for an ambitious  patron,  nor  do  they have  any means  of 
avoiding  official extortion  except  by winning  officials over through pre- 
emptive  generosity  or, as a last resort, by emigrating  to  an area where 
the local headman  is better disposed.  The  same attitude of appeasement 
applies to spirits and the illnesses they can cause: the purpose  of healing 
rituals is to please  and win over the troublesome  spirit, for it makes no 
sense  to  try  and  drive  the  spirit  off  forcibly  (Last,  1991c,  1981). 
Whereas  Muslims  and  Christians,  as  servants  of  God,  consider 
themselves  empowered  to  drive  off  the  dead  or  to  exorcise  demons, 
'pagans'  such  as  these  Maguzawa  conceive  of  no  such  all-powerful 
divine  patron  of their own  who  gives  them  such  power.  The  spiritual 
mastery  they  are  reckoned  to  have  over  the  forces  of  evil  has  been 
achieved,  like  their  material  prosperity,  through  either  hard  work  or 
negotiation. 
Finally just as there are in the farmstead few marked social divisions 
(in the past, people  purchased  as slaves became  part of the household, 
some  choosing  to  stay  even  after emancipation)  and  there  is little  by 
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way of hierarchy  beyond deference due to age, so too the symbols of 
demarcation are few. The internal architecture  of a farmstead  is open, 
and entry to its centre is easy. Clothing is informal  for both sexes; much 
of the body can be left exposed without embarrassment.  Men drink 
alcohol but are rarely violent when drunk; indeed, anyone important 
seldom drinks enough to become drunk. While there is a division of 
labour, for example in the preparation  of food, and men and women eat 
separately,  and every adult has their own room, nonetheless both living 
space and work are shared in  a way not  usually found in  Muslim 
households. There are thus few symbolic 'boundaries' to police, few 
rules whose transgression could conceivably require punishing with 
severity. 
In short, signs of overt control, let alone control through force, are 
kept to the minimum. The problem is not how to master people but 
how  to attract them;  and people  (including  Muslims)  since  well before 
the colonial period have indeed been choosing to join them, as their 
genealogical histories prove. In such a context, corporal  punishment of 
children is simply out of the question. And should there be any danger 
of violence occurring, it can quickly be stifled by other adults present. 
The question remains, though, how do adults socialise their children 
and discipline them? The answer lies, at least in part, in the size of the 
household. In the farmstead  I lived in there were, as I have said, some 
sixty children and forty adult women. There were no barriers  between 
sections of the farmstead:  children were like a tide that flowed in and 
out of adults' living quarters.  An incident in one part of the house was 
rapidly  known by all; the shaming of one child attracted  the others-all 
came to see, and some to laugh at, his discomfiture.  Humiliation could 
not be hidden-someone  hurt might have to run out of the farmstead 
just to get away. A child who offended the other children by his bad 
behaviour or short temper suffered ostracism: to be abused, teased or 
even openly shunned by some twenty to thirty  children  was a significant 
sanction. In short, socialisation  came through adults' verbal  reprimands 
magnified through twenty or more 'loudspeakers'.  Disapproval among 
the adult women was usually less overt but no less punitive. A large 
house exerted considerable moral pressure on all its residents, not just 
children. Lack of  generosity, shirking of  work, lack of  cleanliness, 
excessive grief attracted from other women comment that was hard to 
resist; thus children grew up in a moral milieu that was deemed by 
neighbours to  be  both  happy  and  well  ordered. Muslims  in  the 
neighbourhood recognised that Maguzawa for all their faults none- 
theless knew how to run a contented community. It was a puzzle to the 
Muslims why this was so. Some said Maguzawa  were more God-fearing 
than Muslims, others simply emphasised the strong sexuality  for which 
'pagans' are well known. I  suggest that the  Maguzawa rejection of 
violence also played a part. 
Not  all  deep-rural households have this  policy  of  opposition to 
physical punishment. Local Muslims, whether pastoralists  or villagers, 
are  recognised as  ready to  punish  their  children and  their wives 
physically for doing wrong. For one thing, as small-scale farmers  their 
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domestic  economies  are usually  less  dependent  on  abundant  labour. 
The  traditional  authorities  indeed  are possibly  harsher  in  these  areas 
than  in  the  peri-urban  hinterland.  Local  officials  are  liable  to  be 
especially  ruthless  towards  peasants  who  cross  them.  (One  notorious 
District  Head  burnt the houses  of his  critics.  During  party politics,  in 
one  village I lived in,  a lorryload of villagers  'disappeared'.)  Similarly, 
pastoral  Fulani  took  revenge  on  farmers who  had  driven  livestock  off 
their crops by badly beating  up each  farmer when  he was  alone  in his 
fields.  Nonetheless  I suggest  it  is  only  in  the  relative  isolation  of  the 
deeply  rural countryside  that  a general  policy  of  rejecting  violence  is 
both  socially  feasible  and  economically  rational as one  cultural option 
among  many  for bringing  up  children  in Hausaland.  In the  economy 
and society  of the city and its urban-oriented,  'bourgeois'  hinterland,  a 
very different  situation  prevails. 
The children of Muslims: the importance  of social discipline 
Urban  Muslim  Hausa  society,  by contrast,  is premised  upon  maintain- 
ing strict controls,  and those  controls,  as in any large-scale  state, are in 
turn  premised  ultimately  on  the  sanctioned  use  of  force.  Control  is 
expressed,  on  the  domestic  level,  most  noticeably  by the  requirement 
that  wives  and  daughters  remain,  ideally,  in  purdah;  when  of  child- 
bearing  age  they  should  not  leave  the  house  by  day,  or  go  out 
unescorted  after dark. So internalised  is this rule that, in Kano city, it is 
a locally  well  recognised  symptom  of incipient  mental  breakdown  if a 
woman  cannot resist the urge to go out of the house,  or if she just stands 
for long  periods  by the  door  of the house,  looking  out  (Ilyasu,  1991). 
Houses,  then,  have to be walled  and kept private; the  street is a world 
away.  Children,  who  can  pass  in  and  out  of  houses  freely,  mediate 
between  the  two  worlds  and  act  as messengers  and  agents  for adults, 
selling their mothers' foods or other items-but  their very freedom from 
supervision  in the  street  can be  a cause  of parental  anxiety.  Seclusion 
has  its advantages.  Indeed,  for many  non-Muslim  women  the  purdah 
enjoyed  by  Muslim  women  is  attractive,  offering  as  it  does  freedom 
from the hard grind of farming. Seclusion  also adds status,  as it implies 
the  husband  is  prosperous  enough  to  sustain  the  household  without 
financial help from his wives  (for whatever women  earn by trading from 
within  the  house  is  their  own)  (Schildkrout,  1979,  1981;  Callaway, 
1987;  Coles  and Mack,  1991). 
The  emphasis  on privacy and propriety extends  beyond  architecture. 
For  both  men  and  women,  clothing  has  to  ensure  modesty,  and  the 
body  must  be  kept  clean  and  shaved.  Anything  that brings  on  loss  of 
control-alcohol,  drugs,  gambling-is  banned  (though  the  ban  is 
sometimes  broken  by the young).  In addition  to  the  deference  due  to 
age,  there  is  socially  and  politically  a strong  sense  of  status  that  has 
persisted,  albeit in  altered form,  from the  days of powerful  aristocrats 
with  their  great houses,  large retinues  and  extensive  slave  estates.  In 
those  days  responsibility  for  training  the  innumerable  children  (the 
Caliph Muhammad  Bello had seventy-three,  his father thirty-seven,  his 
brother-in-law  forty-eight,  for example)  was often left in such houses  to 
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the servants, just as public order was maintained by the rulers' armed 
retainers (dogarai;  yara). Today teachers and police have taken their 
place. 
Domestically,  a  beating is  the  chief  sanction  a  householder has 
against disobedience on the part of a wife, child or servant. The Holy 
Qur'an (IV.34) specifically enjoins a 'beating' as the last resort for a 
wife who persistently  disobeys: 'As for those [women] from whom you 
fear disloyalty and ill conduct, admonish them, [then] refuse to share 
their bed, [then] beat them' (interpolations  as in the Hausa version of 
Gumi, 1982; the Arabic daraba,  'beat', is usually translated  in Hausa as 
doka  or duka, and implies the use of a stick or whip). And this verse, by 
analogy, applies to the rest of a man's household. The  Qur'an also 
specifies flogging, al-jald, with a lash for certain categories of offence 
(the hadd offences: 80  or  100 lashes), flogging being rated a more 
serious punishment than imprisonment, al-habs (El-Awa, 1982).  But 
with imprisonment not a sentence a judge would often have imposed 
traditionally  in Hausaland, pre-colonially the gaol was normally used 
for holding prisoners only until their trial. For those  found  guilty, 
punishment was then immediate (cf. Christelow, 1994). (Significantly 
for the religious meaning of punishment, slaves were liable to only half 
the lashes due to freeborn men.) The presence of these verses in the 
Qur'an made corporal punishment religiously legitimate for a Mus- 
lim-just  as similar  religious texts had done for a Jew or Christian (e.g. 
Proverbs 13:24, 23:13-14;  cf. Deuteronomy 21:18-21).  During the 
colonial regime a  British official in  Nigeria might order a  beating 
(instead of a flogging) as an 'instant' punishment which did not have to 
be notified to higher authority.4  A beating, then, was treated as a local, 
almost domestic punishment, quickly over and of no great seriousness, 
for those regarded as having behaved more foolishly than criminally. 
A senior adult would rarely  employ such violence himself (that would 
be demeaning) but would have juniors to inflict the punishment for 
him: the violence, the 'foolishness' of the young is controlled by the 
young-and  inflicted on the young by the young. Demarcated from 
responsible society,  such  violence  is  tolerated or  ignored,  and  its 
casualties are apt to be taken for granted. But it is only one kind of 
violence  among many: the  road is  particularly the  province of  the 
young, as teenage drivers and still younger 'motor dogs' (karen  mota, 
drivers'  mates) dominate public transport, and horrific road accidents 
are common. Rumour has it that young girls are kidnapped off the 
streets by  such young drivers ('yan hiace) and whisked away for a 
weekend. There are also ancient feuds between the young of rival  wards 
that result in violent clashes and vendettas. Come election time, senior 
4 Colonial procedures required, as part of prison regulations, that every occasion a person 
was flogged with a cat o' nine tails had to be logged and included in the regular prison returns 
made to the Colonial Office. If he used a stick, and not the 'cat', the District Officer need not 
log the incident  (Jones, 1989: 520). 
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politicians  hired young  'party supporters',  arming them  as bodyguards 
('yan  banga)  and  to  intimidate  the  opposition  (Dan  Asabe,  1991). 
Violence  among  the young  is seen  as scarcely abnormal. 
In this context,  then,  beating  is not  about  driving someone  off  (as I 
suggested  it was  among  Maguzawa)  but  about  controlling  subordina- 
tes-whether  within  the  house  or at school  or in the  courts  of justice. 
Today,  for  example,  the  juvenile  courts  in  Kano  regularly  sentence 
young  offenders  to a flogging,  just as the colonial  courts or the District 
Officer did, with prison or a reformatory being  seen  as the more severe 
punishment.  Given the conditions  in the reformatory-the  intimidation 
by other inmates  and the lack of food,  for example-the  assessment  was 
considered  accurate  by  most  of  the  boys  who  spoke  to  us  (Kazaure, 
1991). 
Control,  however,  is  more  than  a  matter  of  punishment;  it  is 
exercised  through  the  application  of  discipline  (horo). In  this  context 
children  are  seen  not  as  'visitors'  but  rather  as  beings  who  require 
disciplining  in order to become  human.  Undisciplined  children,  I was 
told,  are 'like animals:  they  simply  sleep,  eat  and  drink'.  Disciplining 
therefore requires making sure children neither sleep too  much  nor eat 
too  much.  Dozing  off  by  day  is  actively  prevented,  and  children  are 
often  woken  up  early in  the  morning.  (Pre-dawn  schooling  around  a 
street-corer  bonfire  starts about  four o'clock.)  Sleep  is not  seen  as in 
itself  good  or healthy  for a child;  and  sleeping  in public  by  anyone  is 
discouraged.  No  one suggests  a child should  go off to bed  early; only if 
during  the  evening  a child  falls  asleep  on  a mat  outside  will  an adult 
brusquely  wake him  up  and tell him  to  go  inside.  Similarly,  a certain 
degree of hunger is considered  good  for a child; and, should  a child try 
to circumvent  it by asking for food from a neighbour's  house,  he will be 
in trouble.  In short, a good  sleep,  a large stomach  are the privilege and 
sign of the  'big man'. 
'Eating'  has  a  central  role  in  the  metaphors  of  power.  By  being 
allowed to go hungry, boys are also learning 'not to eat'. Not  to eat is to 
experience  what  it  is  to  lack  power;  for  to  eat  (ci)  is  to  have 
power-'eating'  being  the  metaphor  used  to  describe  capturing  a 
town,  winning  a  victory,  penetrating  a woman,  getting  a promotion 
(Gouff6,  1966).  Hence  the image  of supreme  power  is the lion  (zaki), 
which  not only eats (and kills) when  it wills but does not have to eat all 
the  time  as  a  farm  animal  does.  (Conversely,  'to  drink',  sha,  is  the 
metaphor  for suffering passively,  as a woman  does; to 'drink water' is a 
euphemism  for taking a husband.)  Learning not to eat, then, is as much 
a part of education  as learning  to  obtain  food;  so too  with  learning  to 
control  thirst. Similarly, aggressiveness  has to be contained;  violence  is 
defined  as  a  'loss  of  control'  or  loss  of  mind  (tashin  hankali),  a 
foolishness  characteristic of the young that has to be disciplined  out. En 
masse, however,  tashin hankali constitutes  a riot by the young  who  set 
out,  usually  with  the  connivance  of  the  politically  powerful,  to  target 
opponents  and their property; in this form it is argued to  be  a way of 
collectively  'disciplining'  a pariah group.  Once within the anonymity  of 
the crowd,  the supposed  hotheadedness  of the young  is used by adults, 
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and excused. Even overt disorder may thus have an element of control 
to it. 
Finally, a child has to learn to control his mouth, this time as a source 
of sound, at least in public. For it is by the way he talks that an adult 
tells whether a child is spoilt (shagwaba;  sagarta).  Speech is meant to be 
taut;  a  spoilt  child  has  a  'loose  mouth'  (shikan baki). Not  only 
wheedling (kyankyanta)  but also chatter (surutu)  are strongly discour- 
aged, with silence the proper response to hurt. A toddler who cries out 
of fear is laughed at and teased by other children until he learns to 
express fear silently. Adults may hesitate to  coddle a child, as it is 
synonymous with  spoiling him  (dan lele) and preventing him  from 
having to behave in public as a human being properly should. 
THE  ISLAMIC SCHOOL AND  ITS DISCIPLINE 
The crucial site, however, for the disciplining of Muslim children is, I 
think, not the home but the school. Schooling is certainly the crucial 
difference between  a  Muslim  and  a  non-Muslim  childhood. Every 
Muslim  child should be  sent to  school; to  acquire knowledge is  a 
religious duty, and knowledge can begin only with Arabic (the sacred 
language  of  prayer and  scripture) and  the  Holy  Qur'an.  Ideally 
everyone should  internalise the  Qur'an, by  learning it  all, when  a 
child, off by heart. The traditional  Islamic school starts that process of 
learning (Hassan, 1980; Hiskett, 1975; Last, 1993b; McIntyre, 1982, 
1983; cf. Bledsoe and Robey, 1986, for Sierra  Leone). 
Although  the  old-style  private Islamic  school  has  been  largely 
superseded by government primary schools  (which include religious 
instruction), the  conventions of  school  discipline and some  of  the 
traditional school  culture  persist.  That  most  parents today  went 
through the  Islamic school  system-and  survived it-has  made  its 
style of discipline not only familiar but appropriate. Many children, 
especially small girls, are still sent to traditional  Islamic schools for this 
reason,  though  government  controls  now  make  certain  kinds  of 
schooling more difficult. 
Islamic schools are of many kinds. There are, for example, those run 
by the local resident teacher who takes in young boys and girls from the 
households  near by  for set  periods of  classwork in  the  traditional 
manner each day. Then there are others, run by teachers for boys only, 
with pupils drawn  from villages far off. These schools are  broadly  of two 
kinds: one has a permanent site in the countryside, where pupils spend 
the whole year round with the teacher and work land lent to him by 
local farmers (cf. Koki, 1977). The other kind is itinerant, where the 
teacher goes on tour round a series of villages or towns, usually just for 
the dry season (cf. Smith, 1954). The school stays only as long as the 
local villages can afford to support it, since the younger boys have to 
feed themselves by begging for left-overs from the  residents of  the 
village or town where their master has set up his school. (Older boys 
have to work for their food). In practice, towns offer more scope for 
begging (Abba, 1984). In some, there are women who run what amount 
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to hostels  for these  children,  giving them  shelter and food  in return for 
work on various household  or other chores.  Such hostels,  children  say, 
vary  greatly  in  the  sympathy  with  which  the  children  are  treated 
(Muazzam,  1993).  For some  children,  it is home  from home. 
In the latter kind of school,  where the children  are not local,  the day 
starts very early, since the main working period may have to be devoted 
to farm or other work; wood  and water have to be collected,  and time 
found for going round the houses  begging for food.  Living conditions  in 
these  schools  can  be  harsh-but  the  harshness  is,  I think,  seen  by its 
supporters  as  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  education.  I  have  already 
mentioned  the  deliberate  reduction  in  the  amount  of  sleep  young 
children are allowed,  the hardships of the cold in the early morning,  the 
thin mat on a hard floor; of being far from home  and short of food; the 
humiliation  too of having to beg for food  and eat scraps. Schooling  thus 
has  the  hardship,  even  the  violence,  that  in more  traditional  societies 
marks  the  process  of  initiation-yet  schooling,  unlike  those  initiation 
rituals,  is  very  long-drawn-out  and  not  always  predictable.  For 
intimately  associated  with education  (or so I understand  from children) 
is  the  fear  of  physical  punishment-punishment  of  a  sort  that  has 
brought the itinerant schools  particularly into disrepute and (along with 
charges  of  neglect  and  poor  teaching)  has  led  to  the  governmental 
restrictions  on them. 
Traditionally,  when  a child  is handed  over to  the  teacher  (mallam), 
the symbolic gifts the father gives the teacher are money  for the leg irons 
or shackles  (mar)  to be  used  on  the  child  if necessary,  and  a cane.  A 
Hausa  saying goes,  'An ear does not listen as well as the body'  (jikiyafi 
kunne ji: Whitting,  1940).  Nor  are the  shackles  mere  symbols.  A boy 
who  plays  truant  or  gets  involved  in  crime  may  well  find  himself  in 
shackles  even today.  One  urban reformatory has perhaps forty pairs of 
boys  shackled  together,  the leg irons welded  on for a period  of several 
weeks,  until the children graduate to each having a leg iron of his own. 
Apart  from  the  restriction  on  movement  (talking  is  wholly  banned), 
there  is  all  the  discomfort  of  sleeping,  washing,  even  defecating 
together,  with  shackles  on.  None  of  the  boys  I  inspected,  however, 
had ulcerated  ankles. In ordinary, smaller schools  shackles are meant to 
humiliate  too.  Though  saved  the  problem  of  finding  food  (which  is 
brought  to him),  the victim  is the butt of his fellow pupils; and he stays 
alone  all night  on the  school  premises.  The  threat of being  shackled  is 
often  enough. 
That the long-term  effectiveness  of this kind of punishment  is limited 
is well recognised,  and explained  by the saying 'A person's  character is 
like a vein in a rock' (hali zanen dutse). The  image  is, I think,  that of a 
grindstone  that  needs  careful  shaping  before  use.  Discipline  is  the 
external  shaping  of  a child.  Without  such  shaping,  without  discipline 
imposed  from  outside  and  internalised  (like  the  memorising  of  the 
Qur'an),  a  child  is  scarcely  human,  and  certainly  not  a  proper 
Muslim-hence  the  contempt  for  non-Muslim  children  and  others 
(such  as slaves,  formerly)  excluded  from  an Islamic  education  and its 
disciplining.  A  child  who  was  resistant  to  this  process  of  shaping  was 
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worthless. Yet no  parent could afford not  to  try. Parents therefore 
handed  their  children  over  to  a  professional teacher  despite  the 
reservations  they may have had about the methods used. 
The methods of discipline that teachers use are not unique to them. 
Similar shackles (or simply leg chains attached to a large log) are used 
by traditional  healers to restrain  the violent or to prevent the confused 
from wandering off. The two professional rationales overlap: enforced 
discomfort, on  one  hand,  can be  therapeutic by  ensuring that the 
madman's body is too unpleasant for the possessing spirit, while on the 
other 'madness' serves as a metaphor  for ordinary  misbehaviour-hence 
the  saying 'A green stick, tamer of  a boy's madness' (danyen kara 
maibida haukan yaro; Whitting,  1940).  Indeed,  in  common  speech 
madness and doing wrong are juxtaposed: people would rather claim 
(and exaggeratedly  feign) madness than admit to a shameful  faux pas 
consciously committed. Furthermore  the spirits  that cause madness are 
themselves considered as  childish, playful and liking dirt; they are 
mischievous companions of children. (For it is not the real 'you' that 
is mad; it is just your body, temporarily possessed by a spirit, that 
is behaving as a spirit might-'madly'.)  The mad are thus treated as 
a kind of  child; the misbehaved child suffers from a kind of mad- 
ness-and  physical disciplining becomes  an  appropriate treatment 
for both. 
Punishment and restraints  are not the only form of school discipline. 
As elsewhere, there is the notion that learning,  or at least concentration, 
is effectively maintained through pain or the threat of pain. Just as a 
goad is used to keep oxen pulling on the plough, so teachers and their 
assistants  have sticks to police their pupils' concentration and aid their 
learning. A  tap  on  the  head  or  back is  not  necessarily meant  as 
punishment-it  is not hard. Though it instils a certain fear of being 
struck and, because of the apparent  randomness  of who gets hit, causes 
children worry (at least initially, as I understand from children), one 
effect is simply to socialise children to adult violence against them. 
Given the basic level of hardship deemed appropriate  for children, 
punishment for actual misdeeds can be quite severe, the flogging being 
intended both as a deterrent and as retribution. Although there is a 
recognition culturally  that pain can be cathartic, in that depictions of 
hell and its torments, and the role of purgatory (barzawo),  all suggest 
that pain is an expiation for crimes against God, I have not heard it said 
explicitly  that a refusal  to learn is itself a 'crime against God' that needs 
to be expiated through pain. Nonetheless education is a religious act, 
and in consequence a certain self-righteousness is involved when the 
recalcitrant are punished. This  righteousness seems to  make excess 
easier, and ensures parental compliance. One of the few novels about 
childhood in Kano, The  Reckless  Climber  by Ahmed Beita Yusuf (1978), 
suggests that teachers may indeed exceed proper bounds (cf. Tahir, 
1984;  Nasr,  1982).  Similarly, teachers (at  least  in  folklore if  not 
explicitly in children's own accounts) are shown as ready to  favour 
some boys, taking advantage  of their dependence, with homosexuality a 
covert theme. 
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Clearly, given the demands  and constraints  of Muslim  life, it is to be 
expected  that some  individuals  will rebel and, in challenging  authority, 
either provoke  severe  punishment  or else  escape  out  of the  control  of 
parents  and  husbands.  And  the  opportunities  for  confrontation  with 
authority,  and consequently  the  expectation  of punishment,  are much 
higher among  Muslims  than among  non-Muslims,  not least because  of 
the village  or urban environment  in which  Muslims  prefer to live. Not 
only may the pupils,  like any gang of lads, get up to mischief  (boys tell 
of the tricks they resort to in order to inveigle  more food  from people) 
but  the  schoolmaster  is himself  very vulnerable  as he  tries to  control 
them  on  his  own.  His  ability to  get  his pupils  to  concentrate  on  their 
studies  inevitably depends  a great deal upon  the older boys policing  the 
younger ones.  He is responsible  for the children in his charge, and since 
news of any serious problems  could eventually filter back to the parents, 
his  reputation  as  a  successful  teacher  is  always  at  risk.  In  such  a 
situation,  in  order  to  maintain  his  authority,  a teacher  may  come  to 
depend  on the severity of the punishment  he metes out. Inevitably there 
is opportunity  for abuse,  from the older boys  and from the master. 
The  question  remains  why  parents  ensure  it  is  others  who  mainly 
discipline  their  sons  by  entrusting  them  to  teachers.  First  there  is the 
understanding  that anyone  can, and should,  correct a child seen  doing 
something  wrong,  and  that  parents  should  not  object  or  interfere 
(though  in practice  they do).  A child,  in a moral sense,  belongs  to the 
community.  Second,  there  is  a strong  tradition  of  public  restraint  or 
emotional  reserve (kunya, 'embarrassment')  between  a child (especially 
the  firstborn)  and  both  mother  and  father.  This  reserve  can  last  a 
lifetime.  A mother  I know spoke to her son in public  for first time  only 
within  hours  of  dying-by  this token  the  son  realised  that his  mother 
knew  she  was  close  to  death.  The  reserve  is,  if  anything,  stronger 
between  father  and  son.  Later  children,  especially  daughters,  are 
treated  with  less  reserve,  but  only  the  last-born  (auta)  avoids  the 
restraint  altogether.  Such  reserve  reflects  the  strength  of  emotions 
between  parent and child,  and how  such deep  affection  can lead to the 
child being  spoilt,  a son by his mother  in particular; for it is the mother 
who throughout  her life is the son's  strongest  advocate.  In this context, 
I have heard a mother  argue that it is necessary  for others to discipline 
her sons strictly in order that her own unconditional  support should not 
spoil  them.  Despite  the  kunya involved,  a father  too  may  favour  one 
child-usually  a boy,  but  I  know  one  case  of  a  girl having  been  so 
chosen.  He picks him out for training, and from a very early age sits the 
boy down,  for example,  on the mat beside  him as he eats or works. The 
boy  is both  companion  and,  in a personal  sense,  his  chosen  heir.  His 
other children,  especially  the firstborn, may seek out  an uncle  or close 
friend of the family who will treat them  specially too.  Parents,  in short, 
are seldom  a child's sole source of either discipline  or love. Nonetheless, 
from the child's perspective  the system may not in practice always work 
well, and a particular situation may prove intolerable.  Escape or moving 
away (tashi; yaji),  rather than confrontation,  is a recognised  last resort. 
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RUNNING  AWAY FROM HOME OR SCHOOL 
A problem, for both teacher and parent, is that boys may run away if 
they can. For this reason parents prefer to send their children away to 
teachers in an area so distant that there is little chance of the children 
being  tempted  to  return home.  To  limit  the  danger and  prevent 
homesickness, the teacher usually has with him other children from the 
same village, so that a tradition  became established  of giving  him, on his 
annual visit to the village, the children who have newly reached school 
age. The children therefore can support each other, restrain perhaps 
any excesses or report them eventually to home. 
Nonetheless some boys do, of course, run away and seek shelter in 
the big towns. Just as young women, wanting to desert their husband 
and  end  a  frustrating marriage, are  able  (with  road  transport so 
widespread) to  get to  a town's motor park (tasha) and from there 
quickly  find lodging, so too young boys can always  slip into the network 
of brothel keepers and traders  who need extra labour. They may even 
join a gang at its 'lair' (daba) in a derelict building or market site and 
act as skivvy to  the older members (Dan Asabe,  1991).  If nothing 
else,  itinerant schooling  at  least provides children with  the  street- 
wisdom-and  the toughness-needed  to survive on their own. 
The bigger cities, then, catered for a transient population that was 
keen to hide. Although, in addition to the local police force, there used 
always to be an intelligence network-the  local government officials at 
the  motor  park,  the  ward  heads  and  other  minor  officials  and 
messengers whose duty was to report daily on the movement of people 
in and out of their area and take note of anything unusual-children 
might  still  slip  unnoticed  through the  system.  For  example, since 
purdah prevented adult males from entering and  easily inspecting 
households  (such police  work is  not  a woman's job),  women  and 
children,  at  least  in  some  households,  were  all  but  beyond  the 
intelligence network's scrutiny. (This also applied to thieves' 'fences' 
and to stolen property.)  Not surprisingly,  there are tales of men or boys 
disguising themselves as women to  escape detection, particularly  at 
night (cf. Maiden, n.d.). Furthermore  the ease of mobility made escape 
simple. Boys on the run might find temporary  work as porters  or even as 
conductors on the lorries and buses. Given that the big cities were 
usually the sites of daily markets  and large towns the venue for a major 
market at least once a week, the daily traffic in and out of towns was 
considerable, especially in the dry season. Traditionally markets had 
always been the cover for infiltrating  spies and for gaining intelligence, 
or simply for meeting people and hearing news. Indeed, it is striking 
how quickly in the past individuals who had been kidnapped or taken 
off by slave raiders  were traced by their kin (Smith, 1954 [1991]). Even 
now there seem to be few places where it is impossible, given time, to 
find someone through the informal  networks  of a town. In short, ease of 
escape was matched by the ability to trace, which thus enabled parent 
and child to renegotiate a link. Today, however, both the formal and 
the informal intelligence networks have largely  broken down, not least 
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because  of the growth of the population,  which  in urban Kano  is some 
six times larger than when  I first stayed there in  1961.  The  search may 
take much  longer now. 
Yet children do disappear without  trace, and not all refugees are safe. 
It  is  a recurrent  theme-a  parents'  nightmare-that  individuals  from 
other  groups  want  to  kidnap  their  children  and  take  them  off  as 
servants or sell them for sacrificial use. That  children do disappear, that 
children  are  approached  by  strangers  in  markets,  is  not  in  ques- 
tion-but  one  instance  or two  can  create  local  panic.  Similarly  some 
religious  groups  (such  as  the  notorious  'Yantatsine)  recruit  young 
people  newly  come  to  town  by  offering  much-needed  hospitality. 
Again,  popular  fears magnify  the  scale  and  the  danger  involved;  and 
rumours that sorcery can rob a victim of his memory  or sense of self are 
rife, reflecting people's  anxiety about the way individuals become  'lost', 
their identity irretrievable. In the past, facial or body marks identified  a 
child  indelibly  but  these  are no  longer  fashionable,  leaving  one  less 
clue.  Another  problem  is  the  way  a  person  normally  accumulates 
several names or nicknames,  only one or two of which may be known to 
people  in any one place. How  many children are 'lost' in this way we do 
not  know.  Parents  assume  their  children  have  only  gone  to  the 
'motorpark  communities'  and  been  sucked  into  the  young  migrants' 
culture; they hope that one day they will return, or a message  will reach 
home. 
Thus  Muslim  Hausa  society  tolerates  a segment  of the  community 
(in towns,  a quarter usually near a market or a motor  park, the bariki) 
that  is culturally  and  morally  almost  independent  of the  rest.  Here  is 
found  the urban version  of the deep-rural  'pagan' farmstead,  in that it 
offers, to the young  especially,  an alternative life style of very low status 
but  considerable  freedom.  Running  away thus has two rather different 
meanings-for  a 'pagan'  it can  be  a route  out  and  up,  whereas  for a 
Muslim  village lad it is often  only  a way down. 
THE  POPULARISATION  OF ISLAMIC SCHOOLS AND  DISCIPLINE  IN THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD 
Given  the  problems  associated  with  the  itinerant  schools  and  the 
dangers  of running  away, given  too  all the  alternative,  apparently  less 
drastic,  ways  of  bringing  up  children  in  Hausa  society,  it  is  perhaps 
surprising that Islamic  schooling  of this kind ever became  so popular. 
Why should  parents wish to send their children  away and subject them 
to  such  harsh  conditions?  The  answer  lies,  I  think,  in  the  peculiar 
circumstances  of the  early twentieth  century,  when  a sudden  demand 
for Islamic  schooling  in outlying villages gave the educated  (and not so 
educated)  an opportunity  to try and earn a living through teaching.  The 
demand  sprang from the fact that the importance  of schooling,  from the 
perspective  of  the  poor  farmer,  goes  well  beyond  providing  children 
with religious  knowledge.  First, such an education  is a symbol  of being 
a  free  Muslim.  In  the  early  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  when 
colonialism  set in motion  the gradual ending  of slavery (up to half the 
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population  may  have  been  slaves),  there  was  considerable  social 
pressure  on  men  to  try  and  distance  themselves  from  slave  status. 
Hence  symbols  of clear Muslim  identity-purdah,  formal clothing  and 
headgear,  village  life,  attendance  at  religious  ceremonies  and  the 
observance  of  the  necessary  rituals-became  more  or less  obligatory. 
Though  hard  physical  farm  work-the  archetypal  task  of  slaves, 
whether  men  and  women-was  inescapable,  alternative  sources  of 
money,  from  trade  or craft work,  reduced  servile  dependence  on  the 
farm income. 
The  economics  of  this  new,  demonstrably  Muslim  life  style  were 
stringent.  Ex-slaves  had few resources to draw upon,  lacking as they did 
extensive  kin networks.  Their  former owners  might  act as patrons,  but 
with their slaves becoming  independent  they found  their income  much 
reduced  and  could  offer little  help  beyond  giving  away some  of  their 
land  (cf.  Lovejoy  and  Hogendorn,  1993).  So  too  the  smaller  free 
farmers lost such surpluses  as their few slaves might have produced.  By 
dispensing,  if possible,  with the labour of their wives,  free Muslim  men 
had not the means to farm extensively;  there was no new supply of farm 
servants  to  help  them,  nor  (yet)  a  ready  pool  of  hireable  labour.  In 
practice  the  acreages  to  be  worked  were  relatively  small,  which  made 
village-based  residence  practicable,  since fields need  not be too  distant. 
But  it  also  meant  that  the  volume  of  grain  produced  might  be 
inadequate  to  feed  everyone  until  the  next  harvest.  In  order  to  save 
grain the response  was, first, for the adult men  to go as migrant labour 
to work on farms farther south,  once their own northern harvest was in, 
and, second,  to send their sons out for education  with a teacher, just for 
the  dry season  or for several years  (cf. Khalid,  1998). 
Whereas  in  the  nineteenth  century  Islamic  learning  had  been 
relatively restricted,  in the twentieth  it was perhaps the most prestigious 
avenue  to high status that an ex-slave  could  take. Many  descendants  of 
slaves became  teachers,  particularly in the countryside,  where there was 
both  increased  demand  and  little  competition.  Today,  with  Qur'anic 
education  part of the ordinary primary school  curriculum,  and with new 
voluntarily  funded  'Islamiyya'  schools  being  established  to  teach 
Islamic  subjects  in  a more  moder  manner,  Islamic  teachers  can find 
work in conventional  schools  and the old-style  itinerant schoolmaster  is 
increasingly  a  rarity  (cf.  Bray,  1981).  Nonetheless  the  tradition  of 
corporal  punishment  survives  in  the  new  setting,  at least  as a threat. 
The  association  of learning with hardship  and pain  continues. 
Seen  in  the  broader  context,  the  expansion  in  the  number  of  the 
schools  provided,  I  suggest,  a form  of  fostering  out  of  children  who 
could  not be supported  at home.  It was a way of spreading the cost and 
putting  the burden  of feeding  'surplus' or 'excess'-but  not necessarily 
unwanted-children  on  to  the  wider  Muslim  community.  Religious 
schooling  provided  the  institutional  framework for this  'fostering'  and 
made it right-as  a pious  act-both  for parents and for the community. 
Sons  could  safely be sent away in this manner,  making it more feasible 
to  care properly  for daughters.  Girls had  to  be  kept  at home  anyway, 
but if they were to be strong enough  to marry relatively early (and thus 
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become  dependent  on  their  husband's  granaries)  they  could  not  be 
kept  short  of  food.  For  the  poor  Muslim  farmer,  then,  sending  sons 
away to  school,  even  if it cost  the  teacher's  fees,  was  an economic  as 
well as a religious strategy of real importance.  But above all it gave him 
and his family a route  out  of the stigma  of slave origin and opened  up 
opportunities  of  status  in  a very  status-conscious  community.  If  the 
costs  included  a rather tough  childhood  for his  sons,  it was  worth  it, 
not  least because  it was the way of the ruling classes; and I think there 
will  have  been  few  boys  who  were  not  willing  to  take  the  risk.  But, 
given  the way Hausa  families  at all levels  try to place  their children  in 
different  niches  and encourage  each  to  have his  own  speciality,  in my 
experience  a child  that really could  not  cope  with  such  an ordeal was 
seldom  forced.  Overall,  then,  this  kind  of  Islamic  schooling  met  a 
specific  need  at a specific  time;  it served its purpose,  but  continues  to 
leave  its mark. 
The  reason for this lies partly in the way people  understand  political 
misfortune  and  how  to  reverse  it.  Colonial  conquest  of  their  Muslim 
state by Christians  c.  1900  could  have occurred,  people  have told  me, 
only through  Allah's  will.  If Muslims,  so the  argument  goes,  practised 
Islam properly again, he might rescind the conquest-hence  the growth 
of  the  Tijaniyya  since  the  1920s  and  the  popular  resurgence  of piety 
that  finally  led  to  Independence  in  1960.  Similarly,  in  recent  years, 
when  military  government  has  given  rise to  unprecedented  hardship, 
people  have  once  more  turned  to  the  proper  practice  of  Islam,  with 
extra fasting and greater attention  to the Qur'an; the proper ordering of 
society,  including  disciplining  the young  at a time  when  drug use  was 
expanding,  became  a major public  priority. Outsiders  may refer to it as 
fundamentalism,  but the political  implications  of this new piety and the 
inspiration behind it are more basic. A return to old methods  associated 
with traditional Islam (such  as discipline  by beating)  serves to instil the 
Holy  Qur'an  into  recalcitrant  boys  and,  above  all,  to  show  Allah  the 
community's  concern  to  reform  itself  and  thereby  earn His  blessing 
(and hence,  people  pray, political  change). 
IN CONCLUSION 
In his lectures  on l'education morale at the Sorbonne  in  1902-03  Emile 
Durkheim  argued that the beating  of children  in school  was a product 
of the very system  of schooling  itself.  The  close  daily contact  between 
those  of  superior  culture  (teachers,  prefects)  and  those  of  an inferior 
one  (new  intakes  of  schoolchildren)  could  of itself  give  rise to  abuse, 
and he suggested  a parallel in the way Europeans  in the colonies  could 
angrily and impatiently  beat  'natives'  ([1925]  1961:  191-6).  It is true 
that  beating  is  not  associated  with  any  particular  religion,  though  in 
France  at  least  religiously  run  schools  (like  those  imitating  military 
academies)  practised  beating  more  strictly  than  did  secular  schools 
(especially  where  the children were working-class),  and went  on doing 
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so  for  longer  (Perrot,  1990:  209-11).5  Beating  occurred in  both 
Catholic  and  Protestant countries, as  well  as  in  Muslim  and,  for 
example, Japanese  societies (Gil'adi, 1992: 61-6; Schoolland, 1996). It 
is,  of  course,  older  than  colonialism. Indeed,  the  earliest written 
reference in Africa to learning  through beating, to children  having 'ears 
on their backs', dates from Egypt c. 2000 BC, while it was only during 
the Augustan period that Romans started giving their children out to 
(often  Greek) schoolmasters who  proceeded to  beat  them-to  the 
protests  of  contemporaries: previously Roman  children  were  not 
beaten,  apparently (Marrou,  1948:  22,  221-1,  367).6  The  broad 
argument is  that once  society develops systems of  knowledge that 
require specialists to teach elements of such knowledge systematically 
to all or most of the young (whether as schoolchildren, apprentices or 
initiates), formal schooling away from home inevitably develops; such 
schooling creates a subculture  of its own, largely  independent of control 
by parents or the wider community. Hence the persistence of beating. 
Two ideas about pain overlap  here. Firstly  that pain is one item in the 
technique of memory, and secondly that it is retribution  for a mistake. 
Both  elements are regularly involved in  the  slow transformation of 
children into adults. Michel Foucault (1975)  examined these ideas to 
show  how  the  new  habits  of  mind  and  behaviour necessary for 
industrial capitalism in  nineteenth-century Europe were  developed 
and enforced through systems of discipline, surveillance and punish- 
ment: how,  in short, Europeans were further 'schooled' even when 
adults (for the military  dimension see McNeill, 1995). The two Hausa 
communities I  have described, though for nearly sixty years under 
colonial  rule  (1903-60),  were  not  directly involved  in  industrial 
capitalism, nor  were  they  concerned with  the  particular kinds  of 
'modernity' that  troubled  Durkheim  and  Foucault.  Indeed,  their 
cultures drew on ideas that antedate European control. The  surveil- 
lance and punishment that colonising Europeans instituted in Nigeria, 
in collaboration  with the local authorities  they appointed, focused more 
on maintaining the semblance of colonial power (or 'peace') over the 
conquered population than on transforming  a work force. 
Nonetheless,  the  disciplining  established  in  the  European-style 
schooling (boko), introduced to create a colonial elite, also created a 
particular pattern  of  modern  school  culture  in  which  pain  was 
associated primarily with punishment. It is surely significant that in 
5 Durkheim's  interest  in  corporal  punishment  reflects  the  way  it  was  a  politically 
contentious  issue  in  France  throughout  the  nineteenth  century, with  the  state repeatedly 
trying to abolish its use in primary schools. School discipline was only part of a much wider set 
ofpeddagogies  du corps  which sought to modernise the population of rural France (Weber, 1977; 
Zeldin,  1980). 
6 Marrou, citing Papyrus Anastasi V.3.9 and IV.8.7, translates the Egyptian text as les oreilles 
du jouvenceau sont place'es  sur son dos: il ecoute quand on le bat. In Hebrew  apparently musar 
meant both  instruction and chastisement.  Marrou also refers (p.  222)  to Aristotle  (Politics 
VIII.1339a)  saying, meta lupes gar he mathesis, and points  out  (p.  367)  that when  Romans 
spoke of 'studying' the idiom they later used was manum  ferulae subducere. 
383 CULTURES  OF PUNISHMENT 
Africa generally this pattern was set not  only by Europeans  who  had  a 
well  established  practice  of  beating  schoolchildren  in  their  own 
countries  but also by missionaries  who  could  make a theological  virtue 
out of beating the young: pain could  also be redemptive.7  Furthermore 
the  first African who  returned  to become  'the Teacher'  had  so high  a 
standing  in his village that when  in turn he started beating  children  (as 
he had been  taught to do)  it was accepted  as in some  sense  'good'.  No 
one in government,  in the missions  or locally had a well tried alternative 
that  was  as  cheap,  fast  and  dramatic.  Though  just  as  public,  tying 
miscreants  up  or shackling  them  as an  emblem  of  punishment  never 
became  quite  as  widespread.  As  authorities  found  in  Europe,  once 
entrenched  in  schools  beating  is  a convention  remarkably difficult  to 
stop.8  Given  how  the colonial  culture  of punishment,  established  as it 
was by men who often had experienced  (threats of) similar treatment in 
their  own  youth,  took  corporal  punishment  for granted,  it is  scarcely 
surprising that tolerance  of beating  (or the threat of it) now  permeates 
the social  system  of several states in Africa. 
Punishment,  however,  is  seldom  just  a private matter  between  two 
individuals; there is usually an audience.  Indeed,  a heightened  dramatic 
element  was  often  crucial  to  what  was  thought  of  as  an  effective 
performance  of ritual public  punishment.  Until  the nineteenth  century 
the spectacle  of a flogging  or a hanging was an important  feature of the 
way  the  state,  in  Europe  as  elsewhere,  demonstrated  before  a large, 
almost  festive,  crowd  its right to  hurt  or kill its  citizens  as well  as its 
enemies  (Linebaugh,  1991;  Gatrell,  1994;  Evans,  1996).  So  too  in 
schools,  even in the twentieth  century  a beating  was a highly  dramatic 
performance,  as it had always been in closed  communities  such as those 
on board ship or in barracks. But recently  some  African states  (such  as 
Liberia,  Nigeria  and  Cameroon)  have  experimented  with  staging 
executions  as  a  public  warning  (especially  to  armed  robbers), 
advertising  the place  and time  and carrying them  out before  a large if 
undisciplined  audience,  even  televising  the  event  complete  with 
interviews  with  those  condemned  to  die.  But  an  execution,  however 
strongly  ritualised,  is  nonetheless  for  real; dying  is  not  mere  drama. 
Thus  (as  in  Europe  earlier)  the  event  seems  sometimes  to  arouse 
sympathy,  even  respect,  for the  victims  as their  dignity  in the  face  of 
7 A question remains about how far missionary teaching about the redemptive power of pain 
(as in the crucifixion of Jesus and the martyrdom of saints) caused converts to revise their 
previous concepts  of the meaning of both ritualised suffering and more commonplace  pain. 
Images of hell, in both Islam and Christianity, featured prominently in sermons and religious 
literature  (such  as  poetry),  with  vivid  descriptions  of  the  prolonged  awfulness  of  the 
punishments  suffered by  the  damned.  Whatever their impact  on  behaviour, these  images 
meant that people became accustomed to imagining torture (and terror of it) as the ultimate 
divine deterrent. 
8 Where corporal punishment  is made  illegal, schoolteachers troubled by very 'difficult' 
children can resort to sending them home  or permanently excluding them from the school, 
thus transferring the problem of discipline back to the parent(s). Being expelled from school 
has consequences  beyond the scope of this article (cf. Parker-Jenkins, 1999). 
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death belittles the state's claim to complete power. An audience, then, 
has its own response to a punishment and (especially with children) 
offers a degree of protection against excess, against the hubris of the 
otherwise all-powerful. 
What this case study also suggests is that the 'right to beat' reflects a 
claim, usually before an audience, to a kind of 'ownership' (or simply 
power) over who or what is to be beaten, whether it is, for example, a 
wife, a young boy, a slave or a domestic animal;  it makes it clear  that for 
them their autonomy is limited. The right is assimilated  into the wider 
right to do (potential) harm to what is considered your own. The claim 
can be asserted by just a plausible threat of beating; how seldom a 
beating  takes place  is  scarcely relevant. While  a  community that 
tolerates the  concept  of  a right to  beat is  recognising a  degree of 
'ownership'  of one human being by another, it is not the most extreme 
degree of 'ownership' conceivable, which would be the right to kill the 
person you 'own'. That degree of 'ownership' is commonly attributed 
primarily  to God and Allah (who 'own' everyone), but some cultures 
(as, for example, in Pakistan) extend a similar degree of 'ownership' 
over a wife or daughter if she commits a crime that dishonours the 
family. It is also a matter of social status. The  person being beaten 
recognises an  'owner's' right over him  and  the  superior status of 
whoever orders the beating (and his own diminished autonomy, his 
own lower status): he or she does not fight back as, for example, would 
someone who disputed another's right to beat him with impunity; at 
most the person to be beaten can run away. Such a right to beat (and 
the acceptance of being beaten as legitimate) seems to occur, as I have 
said, in societies where status is more marked;  the right  not to be beaten 
can be a sign of citizenship (as in the Roman empire). But it can also 
define age as well as status. The very young, who have as yet no 'sense', 
are not  often formally beaten by their father. Beyond a certain age 
young men cease to be beaten by their fathers, and are flogged instead 
by officials appointed by the state to flog anyone it convicts. The right 
to beat is potentially transferable  from a parent to a guardian  or foster- 
parent-and,  most commonly, to a schoolmaster. Similarly,  the state's 
right to flog adults can be delegated, for example, to a ship's captain or 
the  commander of  an  army; lowly young  District  Officers, under 
colonial regulations,  had an equally official authority  to order a flogging 
or, more informally, a whipping. 
The refusal to tolerate beating, then, reflects a community's denial 
that a person is 'ownable' to that degree, and goes with reluctance  to let 
others claim such 'ownership', at least over one's children. So too the 
refusal to beat a wife (and a wife's refusal to tolerate a blow from her 
husband) symbolises a real difference in notions of 'ownership' and 
personal autonomy;  here the status pyramid  is kept relatively  flat. In the 
Maguzawa context, then, where such 'ownership'  of people is rejected, 
it is not surprising  that a person bought on the slave market tended to 
be absorbed into the household, not just in the second generation (in 
Hausa, ba-cucane,  from the Coptic shushan)  but in the first as a 'son' or 
junior  wife (not as a concubine). Here animals  could be owned in a way 
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humans  could  never be.  Furthermore,  though  Allah is now  recognised 
as all-powerful,  the traditional Hausa religion of the Maguzawa  did not 
(and  still does  not)  involve  worship  of  any kind  of  Being  that  'owns' 
humans  in the way Allah 'owns'  Muslims;  nor do ancestors  'own' their 
descendants  in that way. 
Notions  of 'ownership'  and power apart, a second  conclusion  can be 
offered.  Beating  is associated  with  a specific  notion  of 'modernity'  (na 
zamani),  whether  the  modernity  is defined  culturally  as conversion  to 
Islam  from paganism  or as entry into  a colonial  school.  Indeed  it has 
been  pointed  out that the more  educated,  the more  'modem',  parents 
are apt to beat their children the hardest (Uka,  1966: 65).  In continuing 
to resist beating,  even today, Maguzawa  are not just being  anti-modern 
but  are  offering  an  alternative  style  of  social  relations  within  their 
farmsteads; they are also taking a political  stance  against certain forms 
of power  in practice.  Muslims  who  decide  to join such  a farmstead  are 
not necessarily going back to paganism but are taking up a life style that 
rejects  'ownership'  of  people.  Hence  the  deep-rural  zone,  with  its 
different  communities,  can  offer variant  kinds  of  social  culture.  The 
popularity of some of these variants makes them problematic  in the eyes 
of  visitors:  reformers  from  the  mainstream  seek  to  proselytise  them, 
some  to  promote  development,  others  in  the  name  of  religion.  The 
latter seek to make Muslims  recognise  the 'ownership'  only of Allah and 
reject the attempts of local human rulers to usurp that 'ownership'.  Like 
claims  to  personal  autonomy,  then,  claims  by  some  to  'own'  others 
remain a real issue,  even  after the end of a slavery that took beating  as 
one  of its key symbols.9 
A  third  conclusion  is  that  the  acquisition  of  certain  kinds  of 
knowledge  can be  associated  with  pain  or the  fear of pain.  This  is as 
true of modern  schooling  as of traditional initiation  in 'bush schools'.  It 
is as if such schooling  requires memory  and memorisation  of important 
facts, which  are best retained by being linked with pain, experienced  or 
threatened.  Through  pain,  truths  are  seared  into  the  long-term 
memories  of the young-an  extension  of the folk observation  that it is 
through  the  pain  of  making  mistakes  that  all  creatures  tend  to  learn 
what not to do: in school  you learn, instead,  what you should do,  and it 
is failure  that  brings  on  the  pain.  All  learning,  whether  negative  or 
positive,  thus  comes  to be  acquired  by a child  in the  same  manner.  It 
may not be  education  but  it is training. 
As  a  consequence  the  extension,  in  twentieth-century  Africa,  of 
schooling  with its laudable goal of universal primary education  involves 
for all children the potentially novel experience  of either being beaten or 
being  threatened  with  a beating.  While  such  an experience  may harm 
only a very small fraction of schoolgoers,  the community's  tolerance  of 
9 Baba of  Karo,  speaking of  her  childhood  and the  children of  the  slaves her Muslim 
farming family owned in the late nineteenth century, says, 'We didn't play with them much. If 
they did something wrong we hit them  [mu dudduke  su]' (Smith,  1954: 51  [1991:4]). 
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beating lends a wider legitimacy  to violence against  children,  to violence 
more generally against the unresisting and defenceless (which is what 
beating is, as distinct from fighting). Is it too far-fetched  to ask whether 
some of the atrocities  committed against  children  and women attained  a 
degree of  sanction from the  conventional acceptability of  physical 
punishment for young  children in  school  and also at home? Such 
violence then masquerades as 'punishment', whether it is for opposing 
the attackers  or for simply being, in their eyes, in the wrong place. The 
nation, in this scenario, is a school writ large, with the nation's leaders 
as teachers and their use of violence within it labelled as discipline. The 
metaphor makes sense, especially in countries where education is of 
such paramount  importance that it takes 20 per cent of the budget and 
is idealised as the only way forward;  where the village's teacher  has high 
status and where young rebels justify their rebellion as a quest for the 
education they were deprived of  (Peters and Richards, 1998:  187). 
Thus  it is  sometimes reported from Sierra Leone that people-like 
children  in class-were  asked to 'raise  their hands' if they supported  the 
government, with the result that the leadership of the rebel RUF, like 
teachers (or school bullies?), in their turn told people their answer was 
wrong-and  ordered  their soldiers to cut the arms off anyone, young or 
old, as 'punishment' (cf. Shawcross, 2000: 169-82). 
Finally, I  am suggesting that cultural tolerance of the beating of 
children is significant  if only as a surrogate  indicator of other processes 
at work in society. The image that people have of the world beyond the 
farmstead is that it is a place of violence, especially against the less 
strong, and therefore self-control in the face of that violence has to be 
learnt by the young before they enter everyday life in the towns and 
cities. It is also a place where violence is meant  to intimidate and invoke 
fear, and where such fear is coded as 'healthy  respect'. Schools, seen as 
places sited half way into that world, prepare  children for it. But it has 
so far proved neither a welcoming nor a rewarding  world for the young: 
education (even up to university)  has been a road to riches for not one 
of the young men from the farmstead I lived in who twenty years ago 
chose schooling instead of farming. The struggle for work in the cities 
has bred among the educated young a degree of frustration, not to 
mention anger at the humiliation  of having  no income (and therefore  no 
future, no wife), that violence or the threat of violence lies close to the 
surface of urban life; and there are drugs to tempt the desperate. The 
adult world responds with its violence; military regimes, which once 
found some popular legitimacy in offering a 'war against indiscipline', 
proved themselves neither a good example nor a solution. 
In short, while the wider 'culture of punishment' may not appear to 
have changed much over the last forty years, I think there is now a vein 
of social anger to it that is different from people's earlier  wrath at the 
vicious party-political  thuggery  of the 1960s, and under the anger is an 
element of fear-fear  of the young. In part it is due to a loosening of 
central control after colonial rule and to massive urban growth, in part 
also to the visibly  greater  prosperity  of some and the higher expectations 
of everyone else. As a result, despite a rhetoric that still recognises 
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'indiscipline'  as a normal fact of youth,  it seems  that more of the young 
than  ever  before  experience  physical  punishment  as  repression,  even 
revenge;  the moral frame that once  lent it legitimacy  has cracked. 
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ABSTRACT 
Arising out of debates over 'children at risk' and the 'rights of the child', the 
article compares two contrasting childhoods within a single large society-the 
Hausa-speaking  peoples of northern  Nigeria. One segment of this society-the 
non-Muslim Maguzawa-refuse  to allow their children to be beaten; the other 
segment, the Muslim Hausa, tolerate corporal  punishment both at home and 
especially  in  Qur'anic  schools.  Why  the  difference?  Economic  as  well  as 
political reasons are offered as reasons for the rejection  of corporal  punishment 
while it is argued that, in the eyes of Muslim society in the cities, the threat of 
punishment is  essential for  both  educating and  'civilising' the  young  by 
imposing the necessary  degree of discipline and self-control  that are considered 
the hallmark  of a good Muslim. In short, 'cultures of punishment' arise out of 
specific historical conditions, with wide variations  in the degree and frequency 
with which children actually suffer punishment, and at whose hands. Finally 
the  question is  raised whether the  violence  experienced in  schooling has 
sanctioned in  the  community at  large a  greater tolerance of  violence-as- 
'punishment'. 
RESUME 
Faisant suite aux debats menes sur les themes des enfants menaces de violence 
et des droits de l'enfant, cet article compare deux enfances tres differentes  au 
sein d'une vaste societe, a savoir les populations de langue Haoussa du Nord 
du Nigeria. Un  segment de  cette  societe, les  Maguzawa non  musulmans, 
s'opposent a que leurs enfants soient battus; l'autre segment, les Haoussa 
musulmans, tolerant les chatiments corporels chez eux mais aussi et surtout 
dans les ecoles coraniques. Pourquoi cette difference? L'article avance des 
raisons economiques ainsi que politiques au rejet du chatiment corporel, tout 
en indiquant qu'aux yeux de la societe musulmane citadine, la menace d'un tel 
chatiment est essentielle pour eduquer et (<civiliser,  les jeunes en imposant le 
niveau necessaire de  discipline et  de  maitrise de  soi,  qualites considerees 
comme le marque d'un bon musulman. En bref, les <<cultures  du chatiment# 
resultent  de  conditions  historiques  specifiques  et  varient  considerablement 
quant  a la severite  et a la frequence  des  chftiments  subis par les enfants,  mais 
aussi quant a la personne  qui les execute.  L'article souleve  enfin la question  de 
savoir  si la violence  subie  a l'ecole  a sanctionne  une  plus  grande  tolerance  a 
l'egard  de  la violence  en  tant  que  ?(punition>  au sein  de  la communaute  dans 
son  ensemble. 
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